MONTONEROS.

1977 MATERIAL



# Department of State

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ACTION ARA-10

OPR-02 CIAE-00 TNFO BCTGB: ' TSD=00 SV=05 DODE-00 PM-04 NSC-08 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 MCT-01 COME-00 EB-08 LAB-04 L-03 NSAE-00 USIA-06 IO-13 AID-95 SIL-01 /095 W

P 9717387 JAN '77 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8772 THEO AMEMBASSY PANAMA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUENOS AIRES 0675

DEPT FOR ARAJECA) PANAMA FOR RSS ...

F.O. 11652: N/A TARS! ASEC \_\_AR= SUBJECTS MONTONERD ATTACK ON GOODYEAR HOUSE-

4° FRED ADEN GOODYEAR CO. GENERAL MANAGER IN ARGENTINA. REPORTED THE FOLLOWING TO THE RSO: ON THE EVENING 25 JAN 77 IN HURLINGHAM (BUENOS AIRES SUBURB), THE MONTONEROS SPRAYED THE VACANT HOUSE OF GOODYEAR'S PRODUCTION MANAGER WITH 9 MM SURMACHINEGUN FIRE AND DETONATED A TYPE OF PIPE BOMB. THE MONTONEROS LEFT LEAFLEYS AT THE HOUSE, THE GOODYEAR PLANT, AND IN THE TOWN OF HURLINGHAM VOICING SUPPORT FOR THE WORKERS 'IN THEIR STRUGGLES AGAINST THE CURRENT GOVE. THE PROPAGANDA DID NOT MENTION GOODYEAR SPECIFICALLY.

P. RSO COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST INCIDENT INVOLVING A MATOR U.S. COMPANY SINCE THE SEPTS-DEC. 1976 INCIDENTS AT CHRYSLER. ADEN ADVISED THE RSD THAT THE COMPANY HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING LABOR PROBLEMS OF LATE AND FELT THE INCIDENT MAY BE CONNECTED TO THEM, POST WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR SITUATION TO SEE IF GOODYEAR HAS POSSIBLY BEEN TARGETED



# Department of State TEEGRAM

THITTED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE NO

BUENOS 88675 272136Z

BY THE MONTONEROS

OCTOBER 3, 1976

#### Montoneros Leader Escapes Police Raid

BUENOS AIRES, Oct. 2 Mario Fir menich, leader of Argentina's Monto-neros guerrilla movement, escaped from a police raid here that ended with the deaths of five of his men-sources close to the security forces said last hight.

said last night.

They said Firmenich slipped out of the besieged house last Wednesday shortly before a gun battle brokel out between the guerrillas and members of the security forces.

An, army communique said five top members of the Peronist guerrilla movement were killed and four were captured. Two security men were wounded.

Coordinator Deputy Coordinator Assistant Coordinator Intern - '

WASHINGTON POST

80D64.

AUGUST 30, 1975

SEP 2 1975

Argentine Sabotage
BUENOS AIRES Leftist
guerrillas packed about 80
pounds of dynamite into a
drainage ditch under an air
port run way in Tucuman
[Thursday, then exploded it
by cable from a near, by
shanty as a planeload of
border guards was taking off,
unofficial sources said.

According to latest casualty figures, four of the 114 soldiers, aboard the C-130 transport were killed and 25 were injured.

Anonymous phone calls to local reporters said the at tack was the work of the Montoneros, a radical Peronstagroup that also took credit for an explosion that damaged a destroyer in La Plata last week.

Deputy Coordinator Staff Assistant Intern

Coordinator
Deputy Coordinator
Staff Assistant

Montoneros

INCOMING

PAGE 01

RUENOS 09763 2216497

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BUFNOS 09763 2216497

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 HA-85 SY-85 MCT-81 NSCE-88 SSO-88 USIE-88 INRE-88 /873 W

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O R 2215507 DEC 77 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3849 THEO AMEMBASSY ASSIDE ON AMEMRASSY REASTILLA AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO AMEMBASSY PARIS /AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 5158

A -- BUENOS AIRES 9763

E.O. 11652 GDS TAGS SHUM. AR SUBJECT MOTHERS GROUP DISAPPEARANCES: "MONTONERO" DOCUMENT BECOMING INOPERATIVE

REF: BUENOS AIRES 9715

- 1. WE SEE EVIDENCE THAT THE "MONTONERO PLOY" DESCRIBED REFTEL IS TO BE TREATED NOW BY GOA AS AN "INOPERATIVE" EXPLANATION OF THE FRENCH NUNS' DISAPPEARANCE.
- 2. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT ON TUESDAY (12/20) THE PAPAL NUNCTO RECEIVED A FORMAL REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENTS OFFICE TO THE NUNCIO'S EARLIER INQUIRY REGARDING THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE MISSING NUNS. THE HAND DELIVERED RESPONSE (WE WERE NOT TOLD WHO SIGNED ). REITERATED THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERN REGARDING THE NUNS DISAPPEARANCE AND PROMISED THAT EFFORTS WERE UNDER WAY TO LOCATE THEM. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF MONTONERO INVOLVEMENT, THOUGH THE LETTER WAS DELIVERED THREE DAYS AFTER THE FIRST CORPS COMMUNIQUE.
- 3. THE PAPAL NUNCIO, MSGR. PIO LAGHI, CALLED ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON ON FOREIGN MINISTER MONTES. THE NUNCTO, REPORTEDLY, GEGAN HIS CONVERSATION BY STRONGLY QUESTIONING THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE "MONTONERO" LETTER WHICH MONTES DID NOT REBUT, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING THE NUNCTO STATED THAT HE COULD NOT SEND A REPORT TO ROME, ASSERTING THAT THE MONTONEROS WERE HOLDING THE NUNS FOR RANSOM, BASED ON NEWS STORIES; HE HAD TO RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION REGARDING THAT EVEN FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ADMIRAL MONTES DID NOT AFFIRM HIS INTENTION TO SEND A NOTE.
- 4. WEDNESDAY'S (12/21) ARMY CONTROLLED DAILY LA OPINION FRONT PAGED A STORY THAT MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HARGUINDEGUY HAD TOLD THE VISITING REPRESENTATIVE (A MR GADOT) OF MR EDGARD FAURE, PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH HOUSE OF DEPUTIES, THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THE KIDNAPPING OF THE FRENCH NUNS WOULD HAV A "HAPPY ENDING." AGAIN A HIGH OFFICIAL SEEMS TO HAVE DENIED HIMSELF AN OPPORTUNITY TO CITE MONTONERO INVOLVEMENT.
- 5. OTHER EMBASSY CONTACTS -- INCLUDING ESPECHE GIL AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY'S NORTH AMERICAN DESK AND RICARDO YOFRE, SENIOR CIVILIAN AT THE PRESIDENCY, HAVE SIMPLY CLAMMED UP WHEN WE RAISED THE RECENT ABDUCTIONS, RATHER THAN TAKING GOA OFF THE HOOK BY REPEATING THE FIRST GORPS' ALLEGATION.
- 6. MEANWHILE THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN POINTING OUT A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN KIONAPPED SISTER ALICIA'S LETTER AND THE MONONERO'S DOCUMENT, BOTH OF WHICH WERE DELIVERED TO AGENCE FRANCE PRESS ON DECEMBER 17. SISTER ALICIA'S

LETTER STATES THAT SHE IS BEING HELD BY A DISSIDENT GROUP OF THE GOVERNMENT -- "UNGROUPE DISCIDENT AU GOUVERNEMENT ACTUEL". EMBASSY OFFICIALS POINT OUT THAT THIS IS NOT A DEFINITION THAT WOULD PRECISELY FLT THE MONTONEROS. IN ADDITION, THE SYNTAX OF THE FRENCH AND THE SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE WORD "AQUI" ALONGSIDE THE FRENCH WORD "ICI" INDICATE TO FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT THE SISTER TRANSLATED THE LETTER INTO FRENCH FROM A SPANISH CRICINAL

7. COMMENT: WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE CONSIDERED REACTION HERE BY THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TO IGNORE THE "MONTONERO LETTER. IF BY TACKY UNDERSTANDING THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO REGARD THE MONTONERO LETTER AS "INOPERATIVE", IT WILL ENHANCE THE CHANCES OF LOCATING AND RELEASING OF THE DISAPPEARED NUNS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE MOTHER'S OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO. CASTRO

Montoneros

Cade: 17%= 52363

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• Seven persons connected with David Gravier, Argentine banker who reportedly administered the finances of the Montonero terrorist group, were sentenced in Buenos Aires to prison terms ranging from four to 15 years.

Mayranara

# Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

5844

ROME 19304 251344Z

PAGE 01 ROME 19304 251344Z ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 MCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-07 L-03 HSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 10-13 HA-05 /092 W

R 251227Z NOV 77
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8723
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

HINTED BEFIRMAL HOS ROME 19304

E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PINT, SHUM, AR SUBJECT: MONTONEROS ACTIVITIES

REF: STATE 254716

- 1. SUMMARY: REPRESENTATIVES OF MONTONEROS HELD LLESS CONFERENCE IN ROME NOV. 22 DURING WHICH THEY SPOKE OF UTILITY OF FORTHCOMING WORLD FOOTBALL CHAMPTIONSHIP FOR THEIR CAUSE, DISCUSSED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ARGENTINA, EXPLAINED THEIR STRATEGY, DENIED CONNECTIONS WITH FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS, AND DENOUNCED CURRENT HILITARY REGIME IN ARGENTINA. END-SUMMARY.
- 2. REPRESENTATIVES OF MONTONEROS, LED BY "VICE-COMMANDER" VACA NARVAJA, HELD PRESS CONFERENCE ON OUTSKIRTS OF ROME NOV. 22. JOURNALISTS COVERING CONFERENCE WERE INVITED TO AN OFFICE IN ROME, HAD THEIR CREDENTIALS CHECKED, AND WERE TRANSFERRED BY BUS TO MORE REMOTE HALL FOR "SECURITY REASONS". IN ADDITION TO MEMBERS OF MONTONEROS "HIGH COUNCIL", SEVERAL LEFTWING ITALIAN PARTICIPATED IN PRESS CONFERENCE.
- 3. WORLD FOOTBALL CHAMPIONSHIPS: MONTONEROS SPOKESMAN
  DESCRIBED WORLD FOOTBALL CHAMPIONSHIP TO BE HELD IN
  BUENOS AIRES IN 1978 AS OPPORTUNITY FOR OPPOSITION GROUPS
  BECAUSE JOURNALISTS COVERING GAMES WOULD SEE TRUE NATURE
  OF RULING MILITARY JUNTA. AT TIME OF SCHEDULING, MEMBERS
  OF JUNTA HAD EXPECTED THAT ALL OPPOSITION WOULD BE
  CRUSHED BY TIME GAMES TOOK PLACE. NOW, THEY ARE SEARCHING
  FOR PRETEXT TO CANCEL THEM AND ARE ALREADY DRAWING UP
  LISTS OF "UNDESTRABLE" JOURNALISTS WHO WILL BE DENIED VISAS.
- 3. SITUATION IN ARGENTINA: SPOKESHAN DESCRIBED SITUATION IN ARGENTINA AS CRITICAL, CLAIMING THAT UNDER CURRENT REGIME 8,000 HAVE DIED, 5,000 DISAPPEARED AND 10,000 UNDER ARREST. INFLATION IS RUNNING AT RATE OF 170 PERCENT; 2,000 SMALL ENTERPRISES HAVE BEEN RULHED, AND PLANS ARE TO DISMISS HALF A MILLION WORKERS IN 1973. MONTONEROS CLAIM TO HAVE CARRIED OUT 300 "MILITARY ACTIONS" DURING FIRST HALF OF 1977. THERE HAVE BEEN STRIKES IN ALL INDUSTRIAL SECTORS INCLUDING A RAILWAY STRIKE WHICH HAS SEVERELY AFFECTED ALL TRANSPORT SERVICES, ESPECIALLY IN BUENOS AIRES. IN RESPONSE, THE JUNTA HAS TRIED TO REPRESS OPPONENTS THROUGH SHOOTINGS, ARREST, AND TORTURE. WORKERS HAVE ALLEGEDLY BEEN FIRED FOR "SUBVERSIVE STRIKES OR OTHER UNION ACTION.

4. MONTONEROS STRATEGY: SPOKESMAN SAID THAT MONTONEROS HAVE HAD TO CARRY OUT AH ARMED STRUGGLE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF ANY

DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA. HE EMPHASIZED THAT MONTONEROS HAVE NOT AND WILL NEVER UNDERTAKE ARMED ACTIONS OUTSIDE ARGENTINA: THAT THEY HAVE NOT AND WILL NEVER HAVE CON-TACTS WITH TERRORIST GROUPS IN EUROPE OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. THE MONTONEROS ARE NOW OFFERING A PLAN OF NATIONAL RECOUCHLIATION AND ARE INVITING OPPOSITION FORCES TO JOIN IN A "FRONT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION". ACCORDING TO SPOKESMAN. SINCE APRIL A NUMBER OF ARGENTINE POLITICIANS OF DIVERSE POLITICAL ORIENTATION HAVE JOINED MONTONEROS INCLUDING HECTOR MARTINEZ BORELLI, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE ARGENTINE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. NO ANSWER HAS AS YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE ARGENTINE COMMUNIST PARTY TO THE MONTONEROS' INVITATION TO UNITE FORCES. RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF ARGENTINA ARE "FRATERNAL" DESPITE DIFFERENCES OVER OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF STRUGGLE, GARDNER

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INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 MCT-01 SS-15 INR-07 SY-05 /Ø49 R

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Montoneros 80964 6014655 ----12Ø681 141739Z /44

R 141622Z NOV 77 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

R E T STATE 272206

NOFORN

E. O. 11652:

TAGS: PGOV, TZ, US, AR

SUBJECT: MONTONEROS' REQUEST TO OPEN OFFICE IN TANZANIA

- 1. TANZANIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL HERE CALLED ON DESK OFFICER NOVEMBER 10 TO REPORT THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO GET A READING ON THE ARGENTINE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, MONTONEROS. OFFICIAL CLAIMED THAT MONTONEROS REPS HAD CONTACTED PARTY IN DAR AND ASKED TO OPEN AN OFFICE THERE. EMBASSY OFFICIAL HAD BEEN INSTRUCT
  REPORT US REACTION ON POSSIBLE OPENING OF OFFICE. EMBASSY OFFICIAL HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
- AND MEA IN DAR WERE UNHAPPY THAT THE BOTH EMBASSY HERE PARTY HAD BEGUN CONTACTS WITH THE MONTONEROS. THEY FEAR FOR TANZANIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION: TANZANIA WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT BLACK LIBERATION GROUPS IN THEIR STRUGGLES AGAINST THE MINORITY WHITE REGIMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT TANZANIA DID NOT CARE TO BECOME A HAVEN FOR VARIOUS RADICAL TERRORIST GROUPS "AS LIBYA HAS DONE."
- TANZANIA DESK OFFICER CONTACTED ARGENTINE DESK AND ON NOVEMBER 11 PASSED UNCLASSIFIED MATERIALS TO THE TANZA-NIAN EMBASSY REGARDING THE MONTONEROS. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE US CURRENTLY ENJOYS NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND REGARDED MONTONEROS THE GOVERNMENT OF EMBASSY OFFICIAL EXPRESSED AS A RADICAL TERRORIST GROUP.

HIS GRATITUDE FOR OUR OPINION AND STATED THAT HE EXPECTED TANZANIA WOULD NOT PERMIT SUCH AN OFFICETO OPEN.

EMBASSY OFFICIAL STRESSED THAT CONTACTS WITH DEPART-MENT MUST REMAIN IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. HE ALSO STATED THAT BOTH THE EMBASSY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD DETERMINED THAT TANZANIA SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY DECISIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON ITS CURRENT EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US.

# A CLASS IF LED INCOMING Department of State oct 1977 TELEGRAM 80064

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PAGE Ø1 ACTION EUR-12 STOCKH 04262 060742Z

OCT-01 ARA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PA-02 USIA-15 PRS-01 DHA-05 TRSE-00 /074 W OCT-Ø1 DODE-ØØ TNR-07 SP-02 MCT-01 .10-1

062017Z /73-116 

R Ø51548Z OCT 77 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1914 INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES AMEMBASSY MADRID

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 4262

E. O. 11652: SHUM, PINT TAGS. AR. SW MONTONEROS LEADER VISITS SWEDEN SUBJECT:

STOCKHOLM 4214 (NOTAL)

- 1. MONTONEROS GUERRILLA LEADER MARIO FIRMENICH MET WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC CHAIRMAN OLOF PALME ON OCTOBER 4 TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. THE MEETING WAS ARRANGED ON THE EVE OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN MADRID, WHERE THE ARGENTINE SITUATION WILL BE ON THE AGENDA. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, FIRMENICH ALSO HAD THE SPECIFIC GOAL OF ENLISTING SUPPORT FOR FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT HECTOR CAMPORA, WHO HAS BEEN STAYING AT THE MEXICAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FOR ONE-AND-A-HALE YEARS: AWAITING PERMISSION TO DEPART FOR MEXICO. PALME STATED THAT THE SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WOULD SEND TELEGRAMS TO THE UN AND THE ARGENTINE REGIME URGING RESOLUTION OF THIS CASE. HE SAID OTHER SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS WERE DOING THE SAME AND WAS OPTIMISTIC OVER CHANCES OF INFLUENCING ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN THIS MATTER.
- 2. REGARDING DAGEMAR HAGELIN CASE (REFTEL), FIRMENICH SAID HE WAS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN SHE WAS NOT A MEMBER OF ANY GUERRILLÀ ORGANIZATION, POINTING OUT THAT THOUSANDS OF ARGENTINIANS WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED WERE NOT INVOLVED IN POLITICS. DISCUSSING NEXT YEAR'S PLANNED WORLD THE DICTATORSHIP, " WHILE EXPRESSING HIS UNDERSTANDING WITH THOSE WHO DECIDE TO BOYCOTT THE SERIES AS A SIGN OF SOLIDARITY.
- FIRMENICH STATED HIS ORGANIZATION DOES NOT INTEND TO CRUSH THE MILITARY REGIME IN A MIGHTY BLOW OR THROUGH CLASSIC GUERRILLA "LIBERATION" TACTICS. INSTEAD, IT INTENDS TO CONCENTRATE STRIKES ON THE REGIME AT ITS WEAK POINTS IN ORDER TO "TIRE, WEAR OUT AND SPLIT" ITS MEMBERS. KENNEDY-MINOTT

# Department of State

COUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 224833 ORIGIN ARA-14 80 Db4 60/14655 4089

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 MCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /075 R

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M/CT: JJOHNSON (PHONE)
--R 1922507 SEP 77

---032019 200414Z /21 Montantes

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
USMISSION GENEVA

<del>C Ó N F I D E N T I A L</del> STATE 224833

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AR, PINT, SHUM, PINS

SUBJECT: PERONIST-MONTONERO MOVEMENT CONVERSATION WITH US

CHURCH LEADER
REF: USUN 2979

- 1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATED REFTEL INFORMATION.
- 2. WE DO NOT WEST TO ENCOURAGE ANY CONTACT WITH THE MONTONEROS HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT IS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION THAT HAS OPENLY AD-VOCATED, AND VERY OFTEN ENGAGED IN, ASSASSINATIONS, KIDNAPPINGS AND OTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE SINCE THE EARLY 1970S TO FURTHER THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTTIVES. VANCE

# Department of State

#### INCOMING TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-81 10-13 ISO-88 DHA-05 MCT-81 PM-05 NSC-85 SP-82 SS-15 CIAE-08 INR-87 NSAE-88 DOOF H-81 /872 U H-61 /872 W

R 122133Z SEP 77 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE MASHIC 5299

INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES : USMISSION GENEVA

A N-C 1 D-E N T-L A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 2979

E. O. 11652: GDS TAGS: AR, PINT, SHUM, PINS SUBJECT: PERONIST-HONTONERO MOVEMENT CONVERSATION WITH US CHURCH LEADER

- 1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF U.S. REPORTS TWO LONG. "INFORMAL, NON-OFFICIAL, PRIVATE" CONVERSATIONS, WITH KEY LEADERS OF MONTONERO PERONIST MOVEMENT (MRM). LEADERS CLAIM INTEREST IN OPENING DIALOGUE WITH USG. INSIST ON THEIR WILLINGNESS AND CAPACITY TO CEASE ARMED STRUGGLE ONCE FREE ELECTIONS AND OTHER CONDITIONS ARE MET AND PROFESS BELIEF IN MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM. END SUMMARY.
- 2. WILLIAM THOMPSON, STATED CLERK OF THE UNITED PRES-BYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE USA, AND PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF THE U.S.A. , CONTACTED HISDFF (AN OLD FRIEND) AND MET WITH MISOFF ON SEPTEMBER 8 AT FORMER'S REQUEST. HE INFORMED MISOFF OF HIS IMPRESSIONS AND SUMMARY OF TWO MEETINGS THAT HE HAD IN GENEVA ON AUGUST 6 AND 7 OF THIS YEAR WITH THREE LEADERS OF THE MPM: JUAN GELMAN, FERNANDO VACA NARVAJA, AND OSCAR RAUL BIDEGAIN (OFFICIAL MPM BIO SKETCHES OF THREE CONTAINED IN PAMPHLET POUCHED TO SCHIELE TOP SEPTEMBER 8: "RESISTER C'EST VINCRE: MOUVEMENT PERONISTE MONTONERO.") THOMPSON ASKED THAT , INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE, THE FACT OF THESE MEETINGS AND THE NAMES OF THE PARTICIPANTS BE PROTECTED. ALSO PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETINGS, THE KEY INTERMEDIARY, WAS THE REV. CHARLES HARPER, (AMCIT, PRESBYTERIAN MINISTER) AN OFFICIAL OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES.
- 3. THERE THREE MEMBERS OF THE MPM ARE MEMBERS OF THE "SUPERIOR COMMAND" OF THAT PARTY, WHICH THEY CLAIM TO BE THE RESULT OF THE MERGER OF THE "AUTHENTIC PERONIST PARTY" AND THE MONTONEROS. AND WHOSE AIMS ARE SET FORTH IN THE PAMPHLET MENTIONED ABOVE, REFERRED TO AS THE "ROME DECELORATION".. GELMAN AND BICEGAIN ARE EXILES. AND EVIDENTLY NARVAJA LIVES HOST OF THE TIME CLANDESTINELY IN ARTENTINA. HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THOMPSON AS "SECOND IN COMMAND OF THE MONTONERO ARMY, AND SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE SUPREME COMMAND." THE THREE CLAIMED TO BE SPEAKING INFORMARLY WITHIN THE GUIDE LINES OF THE SUPREME COMMAND.
- 4. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE HEETING IT APPEARS FROM THOMPSON'S REFORT WAS TO PROBE FOR MORE CONTACTS WITH THE USG, TO OFFER MPM'S VIEW OF THE PROCESS OF TRAN-SITION TO DEOMCRATIC RULE AND TO SUGGEST POLICIES AND ACTIONS TO THE USG THAT COULD PROMOTE THIS PROCESS. THE MPM IS NOT, ACCORDING TO THE THREE A "CLASSIC GUERILLA MOVEMENT". BUT RATHER A PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT THAT HAS RESORTED TO VIOLENCE ONLY AS A MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE AND BECAUSE ALL OTHER MEANS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY WERE BANNED. THE AIMS OF THE MPM ARE: TO GATHER TOGETHER ALL THE OPPOSITION TO MILITARY.

USUN-N 82979 81 OF 82 122358Z

RULE IN ARGENTINA, TO WORK FOR THE "POLITICAL SOVEREIGNT ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE" OF ARGENTINA, AND THE PACIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE PACIFICATION OF THE PACIF RULE IN ARGENTINA. TO WORK FOR THE "POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, REPEATEDLY TO THOMPSON THAT THEY FAVOR FREE ELECTIONS. THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES MUST BE FREE TO PARTICIPATE AND THAT THEY ARE ONLY ONE (THOUGH THEY FEEL THEY ARE THE LARGEST) OF THE PARTIES. THEY TOLD THOMPSON THEY FEEL THAT THE YSG DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THEM THIS WAY, WHILE THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS -- TO WHOM THEY EVIDENTLY FEEL CLOSE--DO. THEY INSISTED THAT "THERE IS NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO ARGENTINA'S PROBLEMS: FREE ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY ARE THE ONLY SOLUTIONS." DENIED WANTING TO DESTROY THE ARGENTINE ARMY. BUT SAID THEY HAD TRIED SEVERAL TIMES. INCLUDING THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. TO DIALOGUE WITH THE ARMY, BUT HAD BEEN REBUFFED. IN SPITE OF THIS. THEY CLAIM THAT THERE ARE "MANY OFFICERS. ESPECIALLY JUNIOR OFFICERS" WHO DISAGREE WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THEM.

> 5. THEY CRITICIZED THE IMMEDIATE PREVIOUS US AMBASSADOR AND AMBASSADOR BRADEN AS FAVORING A POLICY OF PATIENCE WITH AUTHORITARIAN RULE. AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S SPEECHES DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND SINCE THE ELECTION. AS WELL AS THE PLATFORM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. ALL SEEM TO THEM TO INDICATE A NEW POLICY. THE ESPECIALLY NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD CALLED FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF THE POEPLE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS, AND THAT DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PLLICY SHOULD BE RELATED. IF THIS WERE SO, THEY CLAIMED, THE USG COULD SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF RE-DEMOCRATIZING ARGENTINA. BUT THEY EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE "OLD POLICY" OF "GIVING MORE TIME TO THE JUNTA" WAS REALLY COMPLETELY REVERSED. AND EXPRESSED AN EAGERNESS TO BE A PART OF SOME DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING WHAT US POLICY TOWARDS ARGENTINA SHOULD BE.

> > 13 SEP 1977 Montoneros

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NW 52969 Docid:32735831 Page 12

#### CONFIDENTIAL $Department\ of\ State$ TELEGRAM

INCOMING

USUN N 02979 - 02 OF 02 130020Z. ACTION ARA-14

OCT-01 10-13 ISO-00 DHA-05 MCT-01 PM-05 NS SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 /Ø72 W H-Ø1 

R 122133Z SEP 77 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5300 INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES USMISSION GENEVA

N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 2979

- 6. WHEN THOMPSON ASKED WHAT SPECIFICALLY US SHOULD O, THEY REPLIED THAT US SHOULD MOVE TOWARDS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS WELL AS CUT-OFFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY ALSO SAID THAT US NEEDS A CONSISTENT POLICY TOWARDS ALL DICTATORS, AND MENTIONED THAT THE US WAS MORE FOCUSSED ON CHILE. IN THEIR OPINION, ON ARGENTINA.
- 7. WHEN THOMPSON ASKED IF THEY WOULD CEASE GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IF THEIR CONDITIONS (SPELLED OUT IN THE AMPHLET) WERE MET, THEY RESPONDED, YES. WHEN ASK IF THEY WERE ABLE TO ENFORCE THIS, THEY SAID YES, BUT THEY COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE ERP, WITH WHOM THEY DO NOT YET HAVE "A TOTAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT." THEY ALSO SAID THEY DOUBTED THAT THE PRESENT MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED BY THE MILITARY WITH OTHER MILITARY LEADERS BEFORE DIALOGUES COULD GET VERY FAR.
- 8. AS AN IMPORTANT ITEM THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE US SHOULD INCREASE PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR THE RELEASE OF FORMER WHICH THEY BELIEVE WOULD BE A GREAT PRESIDENT CAMPORA. STEP FORWARD TO CREATING A CLIMATE IN WHICH SOME SORT OF CIVILIAN-DOMINATED TRANSITION PROCESS COULD PROECEED.
- 9. THE THREE MPM LEADERS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO CONTACT WITH RESPONSIBLE USG OFFICIALS, "ANY PLACE IN THE WORLD, ANY TIME," AND SAID THEY WOULD COME TO THE. US IF INVITED." THEY WOULD LIKE THE FIRST MEETINGS TO BE RELATIVELY SECRET, THEY SAID.
- THOMPSON OFFERED THE OPINION . THAT THE THREE WERE SINCERE AND DEVOTED TO THEIR CAUSE. MAYBE THEY EXAGGERATE SOME TIME THEIR PARTY'S STRENGTH AND UNITY, BUT I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THEM AS MEN AND AS LEADERS". THOMPSON VOLUNTEERED TO MEET FOR A LONGER BRIEFING ON THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME, IF THERE IS (HE TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO WASHINGTON.) INTEREST.
- COMMENT: CHARLES HARPER IN GENEVA IS PROBABLY MUCH MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ARGENTINE AFFAIRS, AND MUCH CLOSER TO THE MPM, IF FURTHER CONTACTS WITH MPM ARE DESIRED. HE IS CLOSE TO THOMPSON. END COMMENT. LEONARD

80D64 SS bot MCT Montoneros

#### Going Out With a Bang

A violent explosion which occurred in Buenos Aires on 25 August was caused by disillusioned Montoneros blowing up their weapons and supplies, according to the Argentine police. Leaflets found at the scene of the early morning blast stated that because the Montonero leadership had fled the country some of the remaining members had decided to abandon the struggle and destroy their armaments. The police were not able to apprehend those responsible for the explosion.


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MONTONEROS -

1975 MATERIAL

MONTONEROS.

1976 MATERIAL



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WAS OFFICIALLY FOUNDED 17 OCTOBER 1976, PERONIST "LOYALTY
DAY", AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTY IS MARIO

FIRMENICH. THE PARTY IS TO BE THE CHANNEL FOR
THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF THE MONTONEROS' CONCEPT OF
PERONISM, AS WELL AS THE FOCAL POINT FOR THE CREATION OF THE
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN) TO BE COMPRISED OF ALL
ARGENTINE SECTORS WHICH ARE SEEKING A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT.
WHILE THE MONTONERO PARTY AND THE MONTONERO MOVEMENT ARE
TO REPRESENT THE POLITICAL ELEMENT OF THE MONTONEROS, THE
MONTONERO ARYM AND THE POPULAR MILITIAS ARE TO SERVE AS
THE MONTONEROS' MILITARY OGRANIZATION. THE MONTONEROS
POINT OUT THAT WHAT WAS FORMALLY KNOWN AS "PERONIST
RESISTANCE" IS NOW REFERRED TO AS "MONTONERO RESISTANCE".

LIBERATION IS ACHIEVED IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONVERT
THE SOCIETY IMMEDIATELY FROM A CAPITALIST SYSTEM TO SOCIALISM
AS THIS WOULD RESULT IN ECONOMIC CHAOS. A TRANSITION
PERIOD WILL THEREFORE BE REQUIRED, AND THE MONTONERO
DOCUMENT LISTS TWENTY-SIX STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN
DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THE G-2 IN SYNTHESIZING THE

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DOCUMENT ONLY MENTIONS ITEM NUMBER NINETERN WHICH REFERS TO THE ARMED FORCES AND STATES THE FOLLOWING: TRANSFORM THE PRESENT ARMED FORCES INTO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PEOPLE WHICH WILL SERVE TO DEFEND THE POPULAR REVOLUTION. WE WILL ELIMINATE THE PRESENT DIFFERENCES OF SOCIAL CLASS WHICH PRESENTLY EXIST BETWEEN THE TOP MILITARY OFFICIALS, SUB-OFFICIALS AND THE TROOPS. NOW IN THE ARMED FORCES WHO ARE NOT GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEOPLE OR OF TORTURE WILL BE ABLE TO SERVE WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PROPLET. THE MONTONERO DOCUMENT IS SIGNED "FIRMENICH, MENDIZABAL AND VACA NARVAJA". COMMENT: THE LATTER TWO ARE PROBABLY HORACIO N D I Z A B A L AND FERNANDO NARVAJA.) 3 VARIOUS TERRORIST INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE RECENTLY DECURRED BY UNKNOWN

A. ON 21 NOVEMBER A BOMB WAS FOUND AT ONE OF THE SIDE ENTRANCES OF THE COLON THEATER. WHILE BEING

PERPETRATORS. SOME OF THE INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN

PLACE IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL ARE THE FOLLOWING:

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DETONATED BY THE SECURITY FORCES AN INDIVIDUAL WAS INJURED.

- B. ON 23 NOVEMBER THE CHIEF OF REPAIR SERVICES FOR THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISE (ENTEL) WAS SHOT AT BY AN UNKNOWN GROUP AND WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.
- TELERHONE CABLES WERE OUT.
- D. ON 26 NOVEMBER A GROUP IN A PASSING CAR SHOT AT THE FEDERAL POLICE SUPERIOR SCHOOL.
- E. ON 29 NOVEMBER A BOMB FOUND AT A FIAT AGENCY WAS DETONATED BY THE SECURITY FORCES.
- F. ON 24 NOVEMBER A BOMB FOUND AT THE HOME OF A POKICE OFFICIAL WAS DETONATED BY SECURITY OFFICIALS.
- G. ON 24 NOVEMBER TWO TURES EACH CONTAINING 500 GRAMS OF GUNPOWDER WERE FOUND IN THE DOWNTOWN SHOPPING AREA.
- H. ON 22 NOVEMBER A BOMB WAS DETONATED BY THE SECURITY FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN FOUND AT THE HOME OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE POSTAL SERVICE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

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		Deputy Coordinator
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	THE MONTONEROS IN THE I	and the second s
	THE OBJECTI	IVES OF THE

MONTONEROS IN THEIR CURRENT FOURTH MILITARY CAMPAIGN WITH

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RESPECT TO THE ECONOMIC SECTOR ARE THE FOLLOWING: (1) SABOTAGE
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY; (2) SABOTAGE THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY;
(3) SABOTAGE THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT;
(4) ENGAGE IN "RECOVERY" OPERATIONS TO OBTAIN WEAPONS AND
SUPPLIES; (5) CARRY OUT PROPAGANDA ACTIONS DIRECTED AT
THE BUSINESS/LABOR SECTOR.

THE MONTONEROS STATE THAT SABOTAGE IS TO CONSTITUTE THE CENTRAL ASPECT OF THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE ECONOMIC AREA. ACCORDING TO THE MONTONEROS, SABOTAGE OPERATIONS PRESENT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO STRIKE BLOWS AT THE ENEMY AND CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY AN INSIDER IN A CALNDESTINE MANNER WITH A MINIMUM OF RIST. IN THE VIEW OF THE MONTONEROS, SABOTAGE OPERATIONS ARE ADVANTAGEOUS FROM A POLITICAL STANDPOINT AS THEY HELP PROVIDE PUBLIC PROOF THAT CONTRARY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSERTION; THERE STILL EXISTS A VIABLE AND POTENT OPPOSITION MOVEMENT. ECONOMICALLY. SABOTAGE OPERATIONS ARE BENEFICIAL BECAUSE THEY STRIKE DIRECTLY AT THE ENEMY'S INTERESTS. MILITARILY, SABOTAGE OPERATIONS FORCE THE ENEMY TO DISPERSE THEIR TROOPS AND THUS WEAKEN THEIR POSITION. FURTHERMORE, THE MONTONEROS NOTE

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THAT AS THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN CONTINUES THE MILITARY AND POLICE HAVE TO MAINTAIN THEIR RECRUITMENT WHICH ALLOSW THE MONTONEROS GREATER OPPORTUNITY FOR INFILTRATING THESE. SECTORS.

3. THAT WITH RESPECT

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TO THE SABOTAGE OF LARGE INDUSTRIES, THE PRINCIPAL TARGETS SHOULD BE MONOPOLISTIC ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE BEEN DISMISSING OR SUSPENDING WORKERS WITHOUT PAYING WAGES. ACTS THEMSELVES WHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH PRIMARILY THREE OBJECTIVES IN MIND. (1) DESTROYING GOODS PRODUCED, SUCH ASSTOCK ON HAND: (2) SLOWING DOWN OVERALL PRODUCTION: 医野 英豪 (3) CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE FINAL STAGES OF 17 × 10 11 PRODUCTION, INCLUDING RETAIL ASPECTS. THE MONTONEROS CAUTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OPERATIONS AT EARLIER PHASES OF PRODUCTION TO AVOID PUTTING PEOPLE OUT OF WORK WHO ARE EMPLOYED AT LATER PRODUCTION STAGES.

4. IN SABOTAGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE MONTONEROS STRESS THAT THE TARGETS SHOULD BE COMPUTERS, FILES, RECORDS, ETC. WHICH WILL CAUSE MATERIAL DAMAGE YET WILL NOT HARM EMPLOYEES OR ALIENATE

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THE POPULATION. "RECOVERY" OPERATIONS SHOULD BE DESIGNED
TO OBTAIN A LARGE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES AT ONE
TIME, AND PROPAGANDA ACTIONS SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY
AND LOW RISK OPERATIONS ENTAILING A MINIMUM OF TECHNICAL AND
MILITARY INSTRUCTION FOR THE PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED.

5.	
THE M	ONTONERO PLÂN AGAINST ARGENTÎNE
MILITARY PERSONNEL.	THE PRIMARY
TARGETS ARE TO BE ACTIVE MILI	TARY OFFICERS AND THEIR
IMMEDIATE RELATIVES, RETIRED	PERSONNEL, MILITARY UNITS,
MILITARY CLUBS AND MILITARY S	OCIA ACTION PROJECTS. THE
OPERATIONS ARE TO INCLUDE BOT	H KILLING AND HARASSMENT
WITH THE LATTER INCLUDING THR	EATENING TELEPHONE CALLS AND
LETTERS, THREATENING PACKAGES	. SOME ACTUALLY WITH BOMBS.
SOME WITHOUT. EXPLOSIVE DEVICE	ES IN GIFTS OF FLOWERS, ETC.
THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS TO P	ROVOKE FEAR AND CONFUSION
AMONG THE MILITARY WITH LITTL	E COST TO THE MONTONEROS.
COMMENT:	THE MONTONERO
FOURTH MILITARY CAMPAIGN.	THE PRINCIPA

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TARGETS WOULD BE THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES AND

	A PRINCIPAL	-, - 59 / -
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BUSINESS SECTOR		•

FEÄTURE OF CURRENT MONTONERO EFFORTS IS TÖ BRING ABOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE COMMON MAN IN TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE THE MONTONEROS STRESS THAT THESE OPERATIONS OPERATIONS. SHOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH WHAT IS FEASIBLE AND SECURE FOR AN INDIVIDUAL TO CARRY OUT, SUCH AS ACTS OF SABOTAGE AT ONE'S PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT, CALLING IN FALSE ALARMS TO CONFUSE AND DISPERSE THE SECURITY FORCES. SETTING FIRES, PLACING OBSTACLES IN ROADS, ENGAGING IN KILLINGS AND BOMBINGS IF POSSIBLE, ETC. THIS TACTIC OF INVOLVING THE PUBLIC IN TERRORISM AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES CONTRASTS WITH THE MONTONEROS! APPROACH BEFORE THE 24 MARCH 1976 COUP DIETAT OF UTILIZING SPECIALLY TRAINED AND COMPARTMENTED MONTONERO UNITS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS. THE PRESENT EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE THE AVERAGE MAN WHO, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY BE SUFFERING FROM THE

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ECONOMIC SITUATION, TO VENT HIS COMPLAINTS THROUGH AN ILLEGAL ACT OF TERRORISM OR HARASSMENT, WILL, FROM THE MONTONEROS VIEWPOINT, SERVE TO GENERATE GREATER POPULAR SUPPORT FOR AN ORGANIZED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. IT HAS LONG BEEN THE MONTONEROS OBJECTIVE TO FIRST PROVIKE THROUGH ACTS OF TERRORISM THE ASSUMPTION OF A REPRESSIVE MILITARY REGIME WHICH, THROUGH ITS COUNTERSUBVERSIVE ACTIONS, WOULD GENERATE A POLARIZED SOCIETY FAVORING THE LEFT. THEN WITH CONTINUED PROVICATION FROM THE RADICAL LEFT TO BOTH KEEP THE REGIME REPRESSIVE AND TO WEAKEN THE MORALE AND POTENCY OF THE SECURITY FORCES, THE MONTONEROS REASON THAT WITH TIME THE GOVERNMENT WILL BECOME SUFFICIENTLY DEBILITATED MILITARILY AND DISCREDITED POLITICALLY TO ALLOW THE MONTONEROS TO LEAD

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THE LEFTIST SECTOR TO POWER. WHILE THE MONTONEROS AND RADICAL LEFT IN GENERAL ARE NOWHERE NEAR TO ACHIEVING THEIR GOAL OF TAKING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE ATTAINMENT OF POWER IS THEIR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE, AND THEY HAVE BEEN, AND APPARENTLY WILL CONTINUE, STADILY PURSUING THIS OBJECTIVE THROUGH POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH THEY CONSIDER TACTICALLY APPROPRIATE AT ANY GIVEN TIME.)

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SUBJECT	CAPTURE	OF ROE	BERTO QUIETO	
	LEADER OF THE N	10NT ONER OS		d. Montronio
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		UNCODEI	)	
		ONOODEL	,	
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SUM	MARY: ON 28 DEC	EMBER 1975		OFFICIALS

CAPTURED ROBERTO QUIETO, ONE OF THE TWO TOP LEADERS OF THE WHILE THE FACT THAT QUIETO IS BEING HELD BY THE AUTHORITIES IS BEING TIGHTLY HELD. THE MONTONEROS REPORTEDLY GOVERNMENT'S INVOLVEMENT AND ARE MAKING

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PLANS TO DEMAND QUIETO'S RELEASE. QUIETO IDENTIFIED THE LOCATION OF THE MONTONEROS MOST IMPORTANT WEAPONS CACHE WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED, CONSTITUTING THE LARGEST AMOUNT OF WEAPONS YET CONFISCATED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS ANTISUBVERSIVE PROGRAM. F025x1 IS THE MONTONEROS! POLITICAL CHIEF AND QUIETO MARIO FIRMENICH. THE MONTONERO COMMANDER. IS CHIEF OF THE MILITARY TO FOUL ET OUT & PARTY APPARATUS AND IS HEADQUARTERED IN CORDOBA. ACCORDING THE ORGANIZATION HAS 150 MILLION DOLLARS (SIC) IN A SWISS BANK ACCOUNT AND 50 MILLION DOLLARS DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA QUIETO CLAIMED THAT AS OF THE TIME OF HIS CAPTURE THE MONTONEROS HAD NO PLANS TO ASSASSINATE OR KIDNAP ANYONE AND THAT THE MAIN EFFORT OF THE MONTONEROS IS TO PREPARE FOR THE LATE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. QUIETO SAID THAT THE MONTONEROS HAVE MEMBERS AND CONTACTS THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILTARY. HE DOWNPLAYED THE TIES BETWEEN THE MONTONEROS AND THE REOPLETS REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). STATING THEY ARE MINOR. END SUMMARY. 1 ' ON 28 DECEMBER 1975

OFFICIALS CAPTURED ROBERTO Q U I E T O, ONE OF THE TWO TOP LEADERS OF THE MONTONEROS. QUIETO WAS PICKED UP WHILE ON A BEACH IN MARTINEZ, AN EXCLUSIVE BUENOS AIRES SUBURB. WHILE THERE HAS FOTA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(1)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

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S DETENTION HAS NOT BEEN OFFI	ICIALLY	CONFIRME	).	
		THE	MONTONEROS	S AREV
NVINCED THAT THE GOVERNMENT	IS HOLDI	NG QUIET	O AND ARE	MAKIÑG
ANS TO DEMAND QUIÈTO'S RELEA	SE.			
2. QUIETO HAS BEEN WELL TRI	EATEDÍAN	ID HAS CO	OPERATED	IN .

PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE MONTONERO ORGANIZATION. OF
SIGNIFICANCE WAS HIS IDENTIFICATION OF THE MONTONEROS' LARGEST
AND MOST IMPORTANT ARMS CACHE LOCATED IN A WAREHOUSE IN VILLA
BALLESTER, A SUBURB SLIGHTLY NORTHWEST OF BUENOS AIRES. QUIETO
SAID THIS WAS ALSO WHERE THE MONTONEROS HELD JUAN AND JORGE
B OR N OF THE BUNGE AND BORN COMPANY WHO WERE KIDNAPPED BY THE
MONTONEROS IN SEPTEMBER 1974 AND RELEASED IN JUNE 1975 FOR AN AMOUNT
BELIEVED TO RANGE BETWEEN 30-60 MILLION DOLLARS.

OFFICIALS SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED THIS WAREHOUSE AND CONFISCATED
THE FOLLOWING

150 "HALCON" SUBMACHINE GUNS MADE IN ARGENTINA: NEW

AUTOMATIC SHOTGUNS OF ITALIAN MANUFACTURE: FIVE "COLT" HEAVY

FORM TOWN OBSOLETE PREVIOUS

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MACHINEGUNS; APPROXIMATELY 100 HAND GUNS, INCLUDING SOME U.S.

MODELS; "FAL" RIFLES; HAND GRENADES; THREE MILLION ROUNDS OF

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION; ONE THOUSAND BARRELS FOR A TYPE OF

SUBMACHINE GUN BEING MANUFACTURED BY THE MONTONEROS; A LARGE

GUANTITY OF EQUIPMENT FOR CLEANING AND MAINTAINING SMALL ARMS;

MONTONERO UNIFORMS AND A DETAILED FIELD MANUAL PROVIDING

INSTRUCTION ON SMALL ARMS HANDLING; EXPLOSIVES AND GUERRILLA

TACTICS.

IS THE MONTONEROS POLITICAL CHIEF.

AND MARIO FIRM EN I CH, THE MONTONERO COMMANDER.

IS CHIEF OF THE MILITARY APPARATUS, MAINTAINING HIS HEADQUARTERS.

IN CORDOBA. BERNARDO MOLINAS, ANOTHER TOP LEADER, IS IN

ROSARIO AND IS IN CHARGE OF PROPAGANDA. QUIETO STATED THAT THE

MONTONEROS HAVE BETWEEN 7,000-10,000 ACTIVE MEMBERS AND ABOUT:

300,000 SUPPORTERS. THE ORGANIZATION MAINTAINS A SWISS BANK

ACCOUNT CONTAINING 150 MILLION DOLLARS (SIC) WITH AN ADDITIONAL FIFTY

MILLION DOLLARS DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. COMMENT:

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IN 1974 THE NUMBER OF MONTONEROS WAS ESTIMATED AT 15,000 WITH 2,500 OF THESE BEING ACTIVE COMBATANTS. CONSIDERING THAT THE MONTONEROS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN GROWING, THE 7-10,000 FIGURE CITED BY QUIETO MAY BE CORRECT FOR THE CURRENT ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP. THE 300,000 FIGURE IS PROBABLY MEANT TO INCLUDE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION WHICH IS NOT NECESSARILY ACTIVELY INVOLVED WITH THE MONTONEROS BUT IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE MONTONERO CAUSE.)

4. QUIETO SAID THAT AS OF THE TIME OF HIS CAPTURE THE MONTONEROS HAD NO PLANS TO KIDNAP OR ASSASSINATE ANYONE. HE STATED THAT THE MONTONEROS PRINCIPAL EFFORT IS DIRECTED TOWARD POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AIMED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN LATE 1976. IN ACCORD WITH THIS OBJECTIVE, QUIETO SAID THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FROM THE LEGAL POLITICAL SECTOR, SUCH AS FROM JOSE ANTONIO A L L E N D E, A FREJULI SENATOR FROM CORDOBA. QUIETO SAID THAT ONE POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE THE MONTONEROS MIGHT SUPPORT IS OSCAR EDUARDO A L E N D E, PRESIDENT OF THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY; ANOTHER IS RAUL A L F O N S I N, OF THE CIVIC RADICAL UNION (UCR). QUIETO SAID THAT FORMER PRESIDENT HECTOR C A M P O R A HAS ATTEMPTED VIA

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INTERMEDIARIES TO MEET WITH THE MONTONERO LEADERSHIP AND CULTIVATE MONTONERO SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO QUIETO. THE MONTONEROS WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH CAMPORA. QUIETO STATED THAT IF THE MONTONERO CANDIDATE LOSES, THE MONTONEROS WILL ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE A MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH THEY BELIEVE WOULD RESULT IN A POLARIZATION OF THE POPULATION WITH THE PERONISTS JOINING THE MONTONEROS. QUIETO STATED THAT THE MONTONEROS DO NOT NECESSARILY WANT A MILITARY COUP D'ETAT AT THIS TIME:

HOWEVER, SHOULD A COUP D'ETAT OCCUR, QUIETO SAID THAT THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES OF A MILITARY REGIME WOULD ALIENATE THE PEOPLE AND STRENGTHEN THE MONTONERO CAUSE:

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(classification)

- CONTACTS THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY. HE STATED,

  FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE FURNISHED INFORMATION

  ON INTERNAL ARMY MATTERS AS A RESULT OF CLOSE CONTACT

  MAIN TAINED WITH RETIRED GENERALS ERNESTO FEDERICO DELLA:

  CROCE, FORMERLY CHIEF OF THE ARMED RORCES JOINT GENERAL

  STAFF; JOSE RAUL CARCAGNO AND (FNU) TARASTEA

  (PHONETIC). QUIETO STATED THAT MAJOR ROBERTO ENRIQUE BAUZA

  RECENTLY CHIEF OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PRESIDENCY

  WHO NOW HAS AN ASSIGNMENT IN SOUTHERN ARGENTINA, IS A MONTONERO,

  AND THAT CULONEL CESAR NARCISO DIAZ, ASSIGNED TO THE ARMY

  FIRST CORPS, IS INVOLVED WITH THE MONTONEROS. IN ADDITION,

  CARLOS MENEM, GOVERNOR OF LARIOJA PROVINCE, IS COOPERATING

  WITH THE MONTONEROS.
- THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) ARE MINOR. ACCORDING TO QUIETO, THE ERP HAS DISTRIBUTED PROPAGANDA PORTRAYING A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP THAN IS ACTUALLY THE CASE IN ORDER TO BUILD THE ERP'S IMAGE, LURE RECRUITS FROM THE MONTONEROS AND CONFUSE THE AUTHORITIES. QUIETO SAID THAT THE

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(classification)

MONTO NEROS ARE NOT INVOLVED WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING COMMENT: QUIETO MAY BE DOWNPL AYING THE COUNCIL (JCR). MONTONEROS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ERP, BELLEVING THAT TO STRONGLY LINK THE TWO WOULD NOT ONLY FURTHER INCRIMINATE QUIETO IN TERRORIST AS OPPOSED TO POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, BUT ALSO DETRACT FROM THE MONTONEROS! IMAGE OF ITSELF AS A NATIONALISTIC POLITICAL ENTITY .) WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE REPORT CLASS INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

"GENERAL PACHECO" SECTION OF BUENOS AIRES. THEIR NEXT STAGE OF OPERATIONS,

WHICH WILL BE SOMETIME AFTER LATE JANUARY OF EARLY FEBRUARY 1976, WILL

4 INCLUDE MORE INTENSIFIED ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE ARMED FORCES. MOST OF

2THE FUNDS USED BY THE MONTONEROS TO CARRY OUT THEIR OPERATIONS ARE

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1. THE	OBJECTIVES		ROS ARE TO	SUMMARY. FORCE THE PRESENT	SURE
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LEGALLY AS PA	RT OF A LEF	FIST FRONT. T	HE MONTONER	COS EXPECT THAT OTHE	R
,				AND THE INTRANSIGEN	
SUCH A FRONT. WHO IS PRESEN	WOULD BE FOR	RMER ARGENTINE	PRESIDENT COMME	DENTIAL CANDIDATE O HECTOR C A M P O R NT: THE IDEA OF SU WHICH TIME CAMPORA	A, CH AN
		EXILE, WOULD			•
			•	CT WITH CAMPORA.)	E025x1
				COMMENT: 1) WHILE TH	
PPA HAS BEEN I	DESCRIBED AS	THE POLITICA	L FRONT OF	THE MONTONEROS, IT	ıs \
		CONTROL THEY			
					5 4
	EFFORTS B	Y THE MONTONE	ROS TO FORM	A STRONG POLITICAL	3

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BASE THROUGH THE PPA. 2) HECTOR CAMPORA'S EXILE FROM ARGENTINA HAS BEEN SELF-IMPOSED, AS HIS RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY BANNED BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARGENTINE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAVE NOT BEEN FRIENDLY TOWARD CAMPORA AND RIGHT-WING TERRORIST GROUPS WOULD POSE A THREAT TO HIS LIFE.)

- TO BRING ABOUT THE FIRST OF THESE OBJECTIVES, THE MONTONEROS HAVE IMPLEMENTED A SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES WHEREIN TWO QUARTERS OF THE YEAR ARE DEVOTED TO CARRYING OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AGAINST A SPECIFIED THE LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITY WHICH TOOK PLACE IN BUENOS OVERALL TARGET. AIRES ON 25 JULY 1975 WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN, WHICH THE REMAINING TWO QUARTERS OF THE YEAR SHOULD RUN THROUGH OCTOBER 1975. WILL BE USED FOR PLANNING. SELECTING SPECIFIC TARGETS AND ASSIGNING TEAMS AGAINST THEM, TRAINING CADRE, AND ACQUIRING WEAPONS AND MATERIAL.
- THE CURRENT PRINCIPAL TARGETS ARE THE PARAMILITARY FORCES OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. SINCE THE MONTONEROS ARE NOT YET PREPARED FOR THE GROUP WILL RETALIATE. DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY. HOWEVER, WHENEVER THE ARMED FORCES BECOME INVOLVED IN REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE MONTONEROS. THE MID-AUGUST 1975 BOMBING OF AN ARGENTINE NAVY FRIGATE DOCKED IN BUENOS AIRES WAS AN EXCEPTION TO PRESENT IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY IN RETRIBUTION FOR THE DEATHS ON 22 JULY TARGETTING. 1972 OF MONTONERO PRISONERS HELD AT TRELEW PENITENTIARY IN PATAGONIA. THE BOMBING WAS PROBABLY CARRIED OUT BY A SPECIAL GROUP KNOWN AS THE

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BRIGADA BUZOS," WHICH IS MADE UP OF FORMER ARGENTINE NAVAL PERSONNEL AND 3 DESERTERS. ONE MEMBER OF THIS GROUP IS C O L O M B R E S (FNU), ALIAS "BOTNA VERDE," WHO CLAIMS HE AND OTHERS OF THIS GROUP RECEIVED U.S. TRAINING IN THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE WHILE THEY WERE ON ACTIVE DUTY IN: THE ARGENTINE NAVY. COLOMBRES, WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE ARGENTINE NAVAL SCHOOL UPRISING IN NOVEMBER 1972, WAS ARRESTED BY ARGENTINE POLICE IN MARCH OR APRIL 1975 AND IS STILL IN CUSTODY.

- A SPECIFIC TARGET DURING THE CURRENT CYCLE OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES MAY BE LOCATED IN THE "GENERAL PACHECO" SECTION OF BUENOS IN JUNE 1975 A "BASIC COMBAT UNIT" (UBC) KNOWN AS "GENERAL AIRES. PACHECO" OBTAINED 50 GRENADES FOR USE IN ITS AREA. THE GRENADES ARE THE TYPE TO BE USED WITH GRENADE LAUNCHERS. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH AMERICANS PER SE ARE NOT KNOWN TO BE CURRENT PRIME TARGETS OF THE MONTONEROS, THE HOTEL CALIFORNIA, JUST OPPOSITE THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY IN THE GENERAL PACHECO SECTION, IS KNOWN BY THE MONTONEROS TO BE FREQUENTED BY AMERICANS AND WOULD BE A LOGICAL AMERICAN TARGET IN THIS AREA. THERE TS, HOWEVER, NO SPECIFIC INDICATION THAT THE HOTEL IS OR WAS A TARGET.)
- THE NEXT STAGE OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS, TO BEGIN AFTER THE NEXT PLANNING CYCLE WHICH SHOULD LAST FROM NOVEMBER 1975 TO LATE JANUARY -EARLY FEBRUARY 1976, WILL INCLUDE MORE SERIOUS CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE THE MONTONEROS BELIEVE THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT ESCALATION 1 ARMED FORCES.

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OF TENSION IN ARGENTINA BY THE FEBRUARY-APRIL 1976 "MONTONERO COMBAT SEASON" SO THAT THERE WILL BE DIRECT INTERVENTION BY THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES; THEREFORE, THE MONTONEROS NEED TO BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ARMORED VEHICLES. TOWARD THIS END THE MONTONEROS ARE NOW PREPARING ANTITANK AND ANTI-ARMORED VEHICLE DEVICES SUCH AS VIET CONG-TYPE MINES (NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED) AND ANTI-TANK GRENADES. THEY ALSO PLAN TO USE A SPANISH-TYPE 51MM MORTAR, BUT THEY ARE NOT YET CAPABLE OF USING IT.

COMMENT: THE ARGENTINE PRESS REPORTED THAT UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS
ATTACKED A POLICE OFFICE IN AVELLANEDA ON 4 SEPTEMBER USING BAZOOKAS OR
ANTI-TANK GRENADES LAUNCHED FROM AUTOMATIC RIFLES. THE ATTACK CAUSED
PROPERTY DAMAGE, BUT NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.)

6. MOST OF THE FUNDS USED BY THE MONTONEROS TO CARRY OUT THEIR

OPERATIONS ARE OBTAINED THROUGH KIDNAPPINGS AND ROBBERIES. SOME OF THE

MONIES THUS OBTAINED ARE INVESTED AND USED TO PURCHASE SHARES IN MAJOR

ARGENTINE COMPANIES TO INSURE CONTINUING INCOME. OTHER INCOME IS PROVIDED

THROUGH THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL ESTATE. SUCH TRANSACTIONS ARE

HANDLED BY LEGAL MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS, I.E., THOSE MEMBERS WHO HAVE

NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AS MONTONEROS BY THE AUTHORITIES. A LESS SIGNIFICANT

SOURCE OF FUNDS COMES FROM MONTONERO MEMBERS THEMSELVES. THOSE WHO ARE

LEGALLY EMPLOYED ARE REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR INCOME

TO THE ORGANIZATION. THE PERCENTAGE VARIES, DEPENDING UPON THE INDIVIDUAL'S

FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

COMMENT: SOME OF THE MONTONERO MONEY 5

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OTHE	LOCKW000	E MONTONEROS.	DOCKWOOD;
OTHER 2. CHARLES	L O C K W O O D	A FINANCIER WHO	D WAS KIDNAPPED

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HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FAR). WHICH AT THE TIME OF THE KIDNAPPING WAS A FACTION OF THE MONTONEROS. THE FAR AGREED THAT THE MONTONEROS HAVE SINCE SPLIT BUT THE FAR AGREED THAT THE MONTONEROS COULD KEEP ANY RANSOM COLLECTED FOR LOCKWOOD.)

3. THE MONTONEROS HAVE ALSO TAKEN CREDIT FOR THE THEFT OF OVER ONE HUNDRED "HALCON" WEAPONS AND PARTS FROM A FACTORY IN BANFIELD ON 28 JULY 1975.

BANFIELD ON 28 JULY 1975.

5. IN EARLY AUGUST 1975 THE MONTONEROS SENT LETTERS ADDRESSED BY NAME TO CERTAIN ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE COMMISSIONERS AND SUB-COMMISSIONERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE LETTERS STATED THAT IF IN THE FUTURE THE RECIPIENTS WILL ASSURE THAT ANY MONTONERO WHO IS ARRESTED FOR ANY REASON IS RELEASED IMMEDIATELY AND IS NOT

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TORTURED THEN THE MONTONEROS WILL GUARANTEE THAT THE RECIPIENTS
WILL HAVE A SAFE AND TRANQUIL LIFE. THE LETTERS CONTINUE THAT IF
THE RECIPIENTS CANNOT COMPLY WITH THIS REQUEST, THEN THEY SHOULD
RETIRE IMMEDIATELY FROM THE POLICE SERVICE AND THEIR LIVES WILL
NOT BE IN JEOPARDY. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD THE POLICE OFFICIALS
IGNORE EITHER OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED OPTIONS, THEN THEY SHOULD BE
PREPARED TO SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES. AMONG THE POLICE, THE LETTERS
HAVE CAUSED BOTH EXTREME FEAR AND LAUGHTER.

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505	MILITARY	F A HIGH-LEVEL Y AND POLITICAL NSHIP BETWEEN TH	CAPABIL IT IE	S OF HIS GRO		•
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IN TERRORISM BY HIS ORGANIZATION IS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE TWO
BASIC OBJECTIVES: 1) TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE MILITARY
CAPABILITIES OF THE MONTONEROS FOR THE INEVITABLE, ALBEIT FUTURE,
ARMED STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER IN ARGENTINA; AND 2) TO

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IN 543140 WARNING NOTICE PAGE 2 OF 9 PAGES SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO SECRET BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. (classification) (dissem controls) RESPOND IN KIND TO COUNTERTERROR OPERATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE MONTONEROS. TERRORIST ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN BUENOS AIRES AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S "REPRESSIVE APPARATUS" AS APPROPRIATE TO ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES. THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO JOIN WITH THE MONT ON ER OS IN THE LATTER ACTIVITIES, BUT THAT THE ERP IS NOW ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY CONCENTRATING ON GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN TUCUMAN PROVINCE. GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT IS ERODING, WHILE THAT OF THE MONTONEROS IS INCREASING SUBSTANTIALLY. ORGANIZATION IS SPONSORING THE AUTHENTIC PARTY IN THE MISIONES PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS AND STATED THT THE OBJECTIVE IN THE ELECTIONS IS TO REDUCE THE GOVERNMENT'S VICTORY MARGIN TO AN EMBARRASSING LEVEL. END SUMMARY: IT HAS BEEN THE MONTONEROS, NOT THE ERP, WHICH HAS CARRIED OUT THE BEST TERRORIST/OPERATIONS IN ARGENTINA DURING THE PAST FOUR MONTHS. LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVE IS TO DEVELOP THE MILITARY CAPABILITY

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OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE INEVITABLE, ALBEIT FUTURE, ARMED

STRUGGLE WHICH WOULD PRECEED THE ACQUISITION OF POLITICAL

POWER IN THE COUNTRY BY THE REVOLUTIONARIES. THE

MONTONERO LEADERSHIP IS NOT WORKING UNDER THE ILLUSION THAT

THE ORGANIZATION NOW HAS THE CAPABILITY TO PRECIPITATE CIVIL

WAR IN ARGENTINA OR EVEN TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF TERRORISM TO

A POLITICALLY INTOLERABLE DEGREE, THE

MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE MONTONEROS MUST NOT ONLY BE MAINTAINED

BUT INCREASED, IF THE ORGANIZATION IS TO BE PREPARED FOR THE

TIME WHEN CONDITIONS FOR ARMED STRUGGLE ARE PROPITIOUS.

2. WITHIN THIS FRAMEMORK

THE RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE MONTONEROS AGAINST POLICE UNITS AND PERSONNEL WERE PRIMARILY MOTIVATED BY THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY CAPABILITY, RATHER THAN BASED ON PURELY REVENGE MOTIVES. HOWEVER, SINCE THE POLICE HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE EXTRALEGAL COUNTERTERROR ACTION AGAINST THE MONTONEROS. THE ATTACKS AGAINST THE POLICE ALSO INVOLVED THE RETALIATION ASPECT.

THE MONTONEROS ARE NO LONGER WILLING TO PERMIT THE MASSACRE OF THEIR MEMBERSHIP BY RIGHT-WING COUNTERTERROR UNITS WITHOUT AN

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TOTALLY ON THE GUERRILLA WARFARE STRUGGLE NOW UNDERWAY, IN THE
PROVINCE OF TUCUMAN. THE MONTONEROS VIEW THIS
ERP. POLICY AS SECTARIAN, BELIEVING THAT THE STRUGGLE, IN
TUCUMAN, REGARDLESS OF ITS EVENTUAL OUTCOME, WILL NOT HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT BEARING ON GOVERNMENT STABILITY. THUS, WHILE THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP REMAIN FRIENDLY.
AND WHILE THE MONTONEROS HAVE GIVEN THEIR MORAL AND POLITICAL
SUPPORT TO THE GUERRILLAS IN TUCUMAN, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT
THIS ERP ACTION RESPONDS TO THE REALITIES OF THE ARGENTINE
POLITICAL SCENE AND THEY DO NOT INTEND TO SUPPORT THE VENTURE
IN A MATERIAL WAY, SUCH AS PROVIDING PERSONNEL OR FUNDS FOR
TUCUMAN, IN LINE WITH THE TOTAL COMMITMENT TO TUCUMAN, THE
MONTONERO LEADER ADDED THAT THE ERP- IS LIMITING ITS RECRUITMENT
EFFORTS FOR THE MOST PART TO THE ACQUISITION OF NEW CADRES FOR
MILITARY ACTIONS. THIS WAS SHORTSIGHTED AND
ULTIMATELY SELF-DEFEATING.
4. IN RELATION TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE
MONTONEROS. THE MONTONERO ORGANIZATION
HAD RECENTLY HELD A NATIONAL MEETING, DURING WHICH A COMPLETE.

EVALUATION OF MONTONERO POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND PROGRESS WAS

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MADE. THE EVALUATION INDICATED THE THE ORGANIZATION HAD MADE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN BOTH LABOR AND PEASANT FIELDS SINCE 6
SEPTEMBER 1974, THE DATE WHEN THE MONTONEROS DECLARED THEIR
INTENTION TO GO UNDERGROUND AND BEGIN A FRONTAL STRUGGLE AGAINST
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

THE EVALUATION CLEARLY INDICATED THE SEVERE MONTONERO LOSSES
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BUENOS ATRES, BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT OVERALL
SIGNIFICANT GAINS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED.

BASED ON
THE INCREASE IN MEMBERSHIP AND INFLUENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION,
A DECISION WAS MADE TO INCREASE THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE BY
FOUR INDIVIDUALS, I.E., FROM SEVEN TO 11 MEMBERS.

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5.	THE EVALUATION OF INCREASED
MONTOŅE	RO POLITICAL STRENGTH, COUPLED WITH THE ANALYSIS THAT
THE GOV	ERNMENT'S IMAGE IS STEADILY ERODING, HAD LED TO A DECISION
BY THE	MONTONERUS TO CREATE AND FINANCE THE AUTHENTIC PERONIST
PARTY (	PPA). THE LEADERS OF THE PPA ARE PERONISTS
VAH OHW	E NOT BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS BEING MEMBERS OF THE
MO NT ON E	ROS OR THE REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCY OF THE PERONIST YOUTH
MO VEMEN	T; THUS, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE PPARWILL HAVE A WIDER
VOTER A	PPEAL THAN WOULD OTHERWISE BE THE CASE.
ALL THE	MONTONERO POLITICAL FORCES ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE
PROVINC	E OF MISIONES IN PREPARATION FOR THE 13 APRIL ELECTIONS
IN THAT	PROVINCE. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MONTONEROS IN MISIONES.
ACCORD I	NG TO THE MONTONERO LEADER, IS NOT TO WIN THE PROVINCIAL
ELECTIO	NS. BUT TO ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES DO POORLY.
	COMMENT! THE PRA WAS REQUIRED BY THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
TO DROP	THE NAME PERONIST FROM ITS PARTY LABEL. FOR THIS REASON,
IT IS R	UNNING IN TH ELECTIONS AS THE AUTHENTIC PARTY. MOST
08 SE RV E	RS EXPECT THE GOVERNING FREJULI COALITION TO WIN THE
MISIONE	S ELECTIONS, BUT THE EXTENT OF THE VICTORY MARGIN WILL
BE REGA	RDED AS AN INDICATION OF GOVERNMENT STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS.)

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27 July 1977

### BACKGROUND ARTICLE

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How The Monto Tros Struck It Rich

One of the most lucrative kidnapings of all times was staged by the Montoneros in Buenos Aires on 19 September 1974. While their abduction of the two Born brothers was, strictly specific, an internal Argentine matter, the ransom which was since then allowed the Montoneros to engage in his sterrorist incidents which have been truly international in character.

According to information provided by leaders of the Montoneros, the planning of the operation against the Born brothers began during late 1973 or early 1974. The Montoneros decided that the firm of Bunge and Born, a multinational conglomerate, was guilty of exploiting its workers, was the "enemy" of small and medium size rural producers who were "bankrupted" by the company's monopolistic policies, and was "acting for its own benefit and profit and not in accord with the national interests of the countries where its businesses were established."

The Montoneros concluded that a kidnaping operation should be conducted against the Bunge and Born company and it should be developed as follows: (1) collection of information on the company itself and on its principal leaders; (2) surveillance of target individuals to establish weaknesses in their defenses; (3) selection of the ambush site; (4) selection of Montonero members to participate in the operation; (5) execution of the ambush itself with subsequent escape of the kidnapers; and finally, (6) announcement of a "trial" of those abducted and imposition of a "sentence" which would include a ransom payment.

The information section of the Montoneros provided the preliminary targeting information. After this initial survey and target analysis, which took several months, it was decided that Jorge Born, Jr., should be the major target of the abduction, since he was the third most important man in the firm and would be the one to direct it in the future. The two senior members of the company, Jorge Born, Sr., and Mario Hirsh, were not chosen because both were considered

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too elderly. When it was observed that Jorge Born, Jr., was normally accompanied by his brother Juan, the Montoneros decided to kidnap both brothers.

The terrorists learned that the Born family lived in the Beccar section of the city, and traveled to their offices in the Federal District every day, Monday through Friday, with great regularity. Each morning a three-car caravan would leave the home, and after leaving children in one of the area's private schools, two of the cars would follow a fixed route to the Born offices. It was determined that the family had at its disposal a total of seven vehicles.

The route used by the Born family was over main streets which were normally choked with traffic and well-patrolled by police units. The kidnapers decided they would deal with this situation by blocking off a short section of the main avenue a minute before the Born vehicles arrived, detouring the Borns to a side street, and then reopening the route before police units discovered the trick. In searching for an obvious reason for a detour, the kidnapers discovered that workers were pruning trees along a section of the main avenue. The next step in this phase of the operation was the selection of the specific side street where the kidnapers could divert the Born vehicles and capture the two brothers.

Thirty Montoneros were chosen for the operation and they were divided into five teams. One team, consisting of three members, was to block the main avenue and then lift the barricade once the Born cars had turned. A nine-man team was to protect the blockaders and then move quickly to the kidnaping site and help protect that team. Two groups consisting of five men each (one dressed as a uniformed policeman) were to crash pickup trucks into the Born automobiles in a fake accident. A fifth team, with six men (including the overall operation leader), would actually kidnap the brothers. Finally, a two-man subteam would eliminate a gatekeeper on the escape route.

The attack was set for 19 September 1974. On that date, according to plan, the Born caravan was detoured onto the side street and the Montoneros' two pickup trucks collided with the Ford Ralcons belonging to the Borns. The Montonero disguised as a uniformed policeman, plus six "plainclothes" Montoneros, succeeded in keeping the Borns' guards occupied,

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ostensibly trying to arrest them in connection with the auto accident, while the six-man team removed the Born brothers from their car and led them to one of the waiting escape vehicles. The two Montoneros who had attacked the gatekeeper calmly walked away, leaving two smashed Ford Falcons, two pickup trücks, and five cars--with honking horns--which had been accidentally detoured onto the side street along with the Born caravan.

The Montoneros held a trial of the Born brothers and followed it with a sentencing. The sentence called for the following: a payment equivalent to \$60 million U.S. in cash to the Montoneros, with another \$1 million U.S. in goods to be distributed to specified sectors of the Argentine public; the personal involvement of the Born brothers in company/union negotiations in factories controlled by the Born family; placement of busts of Juan and Eva Peron in all Born factories; and finally, publication of leaflets throughout Argentina to let the public know that the distribution of the goods was made under pressure from the Montoneros as part of the ransom for the safe release of the Born brothers.

The ransom demands were met to the satisfaction of the Montoneros, and the Born brothers were released unharmed several months after the kidnaping.

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PARTY OF ARGENTINA (PCA), A LEGAL PARTY, IS AIMED AT DETERMINING WHETHER THE PCA AND THE MONTONEROS ARE COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES. AS OF LATE MAY 1977, LETTLE SUBSTANTIVE HAS

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
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6 April 1977

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Argentina: Montonero's Financial Assets Seized

The Montonero's ability to carry out terrorist operations is likely to be severely curtailed as a result of the loss of about 85 million U.S. dollars of the group's funds to Argentine security officials. The Montonero official in charge of finances was captured by the security forces last February. During questioning he provided detailed information on the terrorist organization's financial structure, including the location of deposits in Europe.

Escorted by security officers, the former Montonero treasurer traveled to Madrid, where he withdrew \$14 million from a bank account. The group then proceeded to Geneva, Switzerland, where some \$50 million was taken from an account and stock certificates of an unknown value were removed from a safe-deposit box. The money from the Geneva account was given to the Argentine embassy in Bern which sent it to Buenos Aires by means of the embassy's diplomatic pouch. The \$14 million acquired in Madrid was carried back to Argentina by the group. As of late March \$1-2 million of the money obtained in Europe was missing, apparently taken by one of the security officials who went on the trip. Shortly after their return, the former Montonero led officials to a safesite in Cordoba where \$17 million was found and also to a site in Mendoza where \$4 million had been hidden.

Most of the Montonero funds were probably from its kidnaping activities. From the early 1970s until the end of 1975 the Montoneros, like other terrorist groups and bands of common criminals, engaged in kidnapings. Ransoms paid for the release of their victims were often quite high. The Montoneros reportedly received between \$30-60 million for the release of two businessmen, the Born brothers, in 1974. Tough security measures by the government as well as the departure of many non-Argentine business representatives who have been prime targets for kidnapers, has resulted in a sharp decline in the amount of ransom collected by the various Argentine groups.

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8 February 1977

Argentine Government Raid Nets Montoneros' Target Listing of Diplomats

Argentine security forces confiscated a card file labeled "Targets Under Study" during an operation in the greater Buenos Aires area against the Montoneros terrorist group in January 1977. The card file contained names of 11 current members and 16 former members of the U.S. mission in Buenos Aires, as well as the names of their wives.

Also listed were a number of current and former members of other embassies in Argentina, principally officers of the Israeli, South African and Japanese embassies and, to a lesser extent, of the Spanish and Brazilian embassies.

There is no information as to whether the file represented the total data on diplomats available at the raided site or whether there may have been additional information For example, the cards did not include surveillance data or other details of the type which would indicate that there was a definite interest in any particular individual, nor can it be determined whether the listing was currently being maintained. The newest U.S. official on the list had arrived in Buenos Aires during July 1975.

This information provided further confirmation to that which the embassy has long known and acted upon, i.e., that the various Argentine subversive groups, including the Montoneros, maintain data on U.S. mission personnel on a continuing basis. This particular information represents the first listing which actually comes under the heading of potential targets; other listings have not been so labeled. Information obtained during October 1976 indicated that the Montoneros considered that the human rights issue, particularly in the U.S., was working to their advantage. (See the 26 October issue.) Consequently, in the interest of maintaining this advantage, Montonero leaders had decided that for the time being they would not direct terrorist actions against foreign diplomatic missions or their personnel in They feared such acts would tend to weaken the Argentina. Montoneros' position in the context of their being champions and protectors of human rights. It is unknown whether this continues to be the policy of the Montonero leadership.

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VILLA DOMINICO IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. ON 8 NOVEMBER WHEN THE SECURITY SERVICES RAIDED THE FACTORY, COSTAS' BROTHER, JUAN CARLOS C O S T A S, WAS FOUND INSIDE BUT KILLED HIMSELF RATHER THAN BE CAPTURED. HOWEVER, THE LATTER'S WIFE WHO ALSO WORKED IN THE FACTORY WAS CAPTURED AND PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH SOON LED TO THE ARREST OF MAJOR COSTAS, AS WELL AS HIS FATHER. THE LATTER WAS ALSO A MONTONERO AND HAD BEEN USING HIS PRIVATE BUSINESS IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL AS A STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION POINT FOR WEAPONS, MOSTLY HANDGRENADES AND ROCKETS WHICH WERE PRODUCED IN THE FACTORY.

AUTHORITIES HAVE TAKEN STRICT MEASURES TO LIMIT KNOWLEDGE OF MAJOR COSTAS' INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MONTONEROS WHICH THEY CONSIDER POTENTIALLY DAMAGING TO THE ARMY'S IMAGE.

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